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Maritime accidents often lead to serious economic losses, casualties, and 
unpredictable environmental pollution losses. Research has confirmed that more 
than 90% of accidents are related to human factors，which is one of the main 
causes of marine accidents. The purpose of this paper is to review the literature, 
then a certain number of accident reports will be analyzed for text mining, and 
then we will draw relevant conclusions through qualitative analysis. 
 
Human Factor Analysis Classification System (HFACS) is very practical and has 
been used in accident analysis in aviation, coal mining and other industries. In 
order to better study the maritime accident, this paper summarizes the contents of 
each element through the literature research method, combined with the maritime 
accident HFACS model framework, and provides a basis for using the model to 
analyze accident reports from various databases. Then based on the maritime 
accident HFACS model framework, the qualitative analysis software NVivo was 
used for statistical analysis of 330 maritime accident reports, and the number of 
causative factors at all levels of the framework was obtained. Finally, this paper 
summarizes the results of NVivo analysis and the impact of the upper layer on the 
lower layer of the maritime accident HFACS model framework and puts forward 
some suggestions for the prevention of maritime accidents. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Research Background 
Accidents at sea often lead to serious economic losses, casualties, and 
unpredictable environmental pollution losses. In order to avoid the occurrence of 
maritime accidents, it is particularly important to study the causes. Rothblum 
(2000), based on an analysis of the US Coast Guard report, pointed out that 
approximately 75% to 96% of marine casualties are at least partially caused by 
some form of human error. Tzannatos (2010) investigated the Greek marine 
accidents that occurred between 1993 and 2006 and found that human factors 
accounted for 57.1% of the investigations. According to the statistics of the British 
P&I Association (1997, 2004, 2005), more than 53% of the maritime and port 
accidents in recent years were caused by human error, of which 21%, 16%, 11%, 
4% and 2% are errors of deck personnel, crew members, shore personnel, pilots 
and engineering personnel. The unsafe acts of the crew, as well as physical, 
psychological, medical, workplace and environmental factors, obviously led to 
such accidents. Other studies and reports also indicate that 60% to 90% of 
maritime accidents can be attributed to "human factors" (Zohar, 1980; Sherry, 
1991; Mars, 1996). 
 
At present, the research on the causes of accidents has shifted from individuals to 
organizations. The HFACS model initially analyzes human errors in the aviation 
field and explores the individual factors, working conditions, team factors and 
organizational factors of accidents in this field. It has a positive impact on accident 
prevention. The model has been tried and applied in the fields of navigation, 
mining, railways, etc., all of which are practical and reliable. 
 
There are many reasons for maritime accidents, including environmental and 
mechanical reasons such as weather and driving equipment, as well as human 
factors such as misjudgment of collision avoidance and illegal operations, as well 
as daily management reasons. Among them, human reasons should dominate, 
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because whether it is daily management, mechanical operation or environmental 
conditions judgment, all are carried out by people, and the quality of people varies, 
and the handover between people may be affected, resulting in wrong behavior. On 
the other hand, according to behavioral and psychological research, human 
behavior will be affected by the surrounding environment and personal 
psychological factors, which may lead to violations and errors in work. Therefore, 
it is of great significance to study the human factors of maritime accidents. 
 
This study focuses on the analysis of human factors in maritime accidents, 
categorizes and elaborate the human factors in maritime accidents, thoroughly 
analyzes the human factors that caused the accidents, and gives targeted measures 
in order to put forward certain suggestions for maritime safety management, which 
allows maritime accidents to be greatly reduced while minimizing damage to the 
environment and personnel. In this study, through in-depth analysis of the human 
factors of maritime accidents, it can promote the safety management of maritime 
navigation, and at the same time, it can promote the improvement of the crews' 
safety awareness, so that they realize that their daily work behaviors will play an 
important role in international maritime transportation. In the meantime, people's 
understanding of human errors can help to formulate safety management systems. 
 
1.2 Literature Review 
Human factors have always been a major issue in the study of marine accidents. 
People have never stopped researching in this area. Research on this topic can be 
traced back to the late 1980s. 
 
Gordon (1988) used data mining methods to study how human factors caused Oil 
spill accidents. After collecting 25 types of accident report forms for offshore oil 
companies in the North Sea UK, the author manually identified various types of 
human factors in the accident reports and roughly classified them, and finally put 
forward suggestions on how to improve these accident report forms. Helfrich 
(1999) used data mining methods to research the reliability of researchers from a 
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technical perspective (from the perspective of probabilistic models) or an overall 
psychological perspective using information processing or decision-making 
models. After the author re-identified and analyzed human factors in 100 marine 
accidents manually, research shows that there are serious flaws in focusing on 
individuals or a collection of individuals. Statistical analysis shows that individual 
contributions are not independent. Instead, they seem to be influenced by the social 
interactions reflected in the two's cases. 
Ten years later, people's research on the subject shifted from individual to 
organization. 
Celika and Cebi (2009) used the method of data mining to propose an analytic 
human factor analysis and classification system (HFACS) based on the fuzzy 
analytic hierarchy process (FAHP) to identify the role of human error in 
transportation accidents. The author performed manual human identification of the 
collected accident reports and categorized these factors into the broad structure of 
HFACS, including four main levels of investigation programs, which are classified 
into the following categories: unsafe behaviours, prerequisites for unsafe 
behaviours, unsafe surveillance and organizational impact.  
Chauvin et al. (2013) used data mining methods and introduced a modified version 
of the human factor analysis and classification system. The data manually 
extracted and analyzed by the author from the MAIB and TSB reports shows that 
most conflicts are caused by decision errors. 
Akyuz and Celik (2014) combined the human factor analysis and classification 
system (HFACS) with the cognitive map (CM) to manually identify human factors 
and determine the positive and negative relationships between human factors for 
marine accident analysis. The HFACS-CM model is considered as a hybrid 
accident analysis method. It provides the distribution of human error by 
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considering operational evidence. The data comes from MAIB. The results show 
that the HFACS-CM method is operational in practice and can help identify and 
reduce human accidents. 
Akhtar and Utne (2014) used a mathematical model to introduce a general method 
for developing Bayesian networks (BN) to model the risk of maritime ship 
accidents. The data were derived from 93 accident investigation reports. The BN 
model shows that fatigue has a significant impact on the possibility of grounding. 
Operator exhaustion has increased the likelihood of large ships being grounded for 
long-distance transport by 23%.  
Sandhaland et al. (2015) studied the accident of the ship collision, using 
descriptive analysis research methods, with the data sources from the Norwegian 
Maritime Authority. The Norwegian Petroleum Safety Bureau analyzed the 
personnel factors, technical factors and organizational factors in the accident report. 
The results showed that the insufficient operation plan, insufficient bridge resource 
management, insufficient training, and communication failure were important 
factors that caused the collision.  
Lee et al. (2017) used a descriptive model to study sinking accidents using the 
Accimap model. The research framework included: governance and legislation, 
regulatory agencies and associations, company management and local planning, 
technical management, operational management, and accidents. The AcciMap 
model was then used to investigate the Sewol Ferry accident. Finally, the research 
results showed that non-proactive governmental body, inadequate regulations, law 
oversight, poor safety culture, in consideration of human factors issues, and lack of 
operating standards and emergency procedures were the main reasons why such a 
tragedy happened.  
Zhang et al. (2018) used Bayesian Network (BN) with interval probabilities to 
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model and investigate incident reports from Marine Accident Investigation Branch 
UK (MAIB), Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) and Australian 
Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB). Due to the lack of statistical information on 
maritime accidents, the investigation needs to include expert judgments. The 
authors show the differences in the input results from different experts, thereby 
verifying the uncertainty in risk modeling.  
 
Kuzu et al. (2019) analyzed the risk of ship mooring operation in the maritime 
industry based on the mathematical model Fuzzy Fault Tree Analysis (FFTA) for 
maritime accident reports from MAIB (2015, 2017). The author believes that 
misinformation and standing in the snap-back zone during mooring operation are 
important basic reasons for the risk of ship mooring operation.  
 
Hu et al. (2019) used Structural Equation Numerical Modeling to study maritime 
accidents. First, the HFACS model is used to manually identify the causal factors 
of maritime accidents, which are divided into four levels of maritime accidents, 
namely Unsafe Acts, Preconditions for Unsafe Acts, Unsafe Supervisions, and 
Organizational Influences, and structural equation model was used to simulate the 
path of maritime accidents. In the end, experiments showed that there were 
different correlations between various factors in HFACS. Resource management in 
the sub-hierarchy of Organizational Influences has a prominent position in the 
formation of the accident and has a strong correlation. 
 
Unver et al. (2019) used a mathematical model of fuzzy fault tree analysis to study 
the Explosion accident of a ship and conducted expert consultation to obtain the 
data required for the root cause.  It was finally concluded that the probability of a 
crankcase explosion was very low, but in terms of the lives of ships, cargo and 
people, a crankcase explosion is one of the most dangerous accidents in the 
shipping industry. 
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Zhang et al. (2019) used HFACS and mathematical model FTA to study ship 
collisions between assistantships and icebreakers on Arctic routes. The research 
data comes from 17 accident reports of the Swedish Accident Investigation Board 
and Marine Accident Investigation Branch. 
 
It can be seen that people's research on maritime accidents is now not only seeking 
breakthroughs in ship hardware, but also conducting in-depth research on many 
factors such as operation, management, and culture. It is expected that we can try 
our best to ensure that the accidents are not caused by other than technological and 
natural disasters while controlling accidents on the ship's technical conditions. 
 
Besides, through a literature review, the author found that a small number of 
articles used the Accimap and Cream models, most of which were text-descriptive 
causal logic diagrams.  It is worth noting that in the application of the actual 
CREAM model, there are many changes, and the main node logic of Accimap is 
common in different articles.  However, most of the remaining articles use the 
Bayesian network model. They set up corresponding nodes during the study, and 
the large nodes between different articles are similar, namely Organization 
Influence, Unsafe Supervision, Precondition, Unsafe acts. The author finds that the 
common model of these articles is HFACS, and most articles divide the accident 
occurrence process into the above four processes. 
 
HFACS is a highly applied analysis method and has very sophisticated 
applications in aerospace, shipbuilding, coal mine production and other industries. 
At present, in the literature on human factor analysis of maritime accidents based 
on accident reports, almost no literature has computer-aided software involved in 
the automation work during the pre-processing report. Although one can use the 
HFACS model for quantitative practice (Akyuz and Celik 2014), Celik et al. (2010) 
believe that there is a lack of consistent data for analysis in the field of maritime 
safety. Akhtar and Utne (2015) adopted the CREAM model for the analysis of 
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accident reports and believed that accident reports lack consistency, and it is 
difficult to obtain statistical data without subjective interpretation. Mazaheri et al. 
(2015) believe that people need a more systematic method to prepare accident 
reports. Zhang et al. (2019) used Bayesian networks to predict risks and believed 
that the involvement of different experts in modelling based on accident reports 
brought a high degree of epistemic uncertainty, and linguistic terms could help 
experts make judgments. In order to quickly process a large number of inconsistent 
accident data and reduce omissions in the process, the computer-aided analysis 
software NVivo based on natural language coding was introduced. The software is 
currently popular professional computer-aided qualitative analysis software, which 
can quantify qualitative data such as documents, videos, audios, and pictures as 
much as possible, process and analyze the data and draw conclusions.  It can 
effectively store a large amount of textual data. With the help of nodes and by 
establishing a tree-like structure, the data with common attributes are combined to 
help researchers sort out the data to avoid leaks and to perform qualitative and 
quantitative analysis of the data. 
1.3  Research content 
The research content of this article mainly has the following two parts: 
(1) Through a large amount of literature reading, compare the various accident
cause models, and determine the use of simple and intuitive HFACS accident
analysis framework for the analysis of marine accidents: through comparison, the
use of data processing capabilities in statistical analysis NVivo as an analysis tool
(2) Through literature research, the author will build a comprehensive HFACS
analysis framework, and use the framework to use NVivo software to plan and
uniformly encode the collected maritime accidents, and to summarize the
human-caused factors under the maritime accident HFACS framework.  In the
end, the author will put forward corresponding countermeasures to prevent
maritime accidents. The technical route of this article is shown in Figure 1.
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Figure 1 The research route of this article 
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Chapter 2 Cause analysis method and theoretical basis of 
maritime accidents 
 
2.1 Qualitative analysis software NVivo and its applicability 
For the processing of large amounts of information, researchers are prone to 
information leakage through direct reading, and the workload is huge. At this time, 
the use of computer-aided software has become an effective method to avoid 
information leakage and reduce workload.  
Figure 2 Analysis flow chart 
 
NVivo software is a popular professional computer-aided qualitative analysis 
software (Welsh 2002; Zamawe 2015), which can quantify qualitative data such as 
documents, videos, audios, and pictures as much as possible, and process the data 
to conclude (Lewis 2004; Rich & Patashnick 2002; Rajab et al., 2018; Mortelmans 
2019). The software highlights key points by creating projects, collecting materials, 
creating nodes, and simple coding; implementing queries to find patterns in the 
data and drawing models; visually displaying links in the data, creating charts, 
running reports, and other functions to help research. The author simply organizes 
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and constructs complex information and extracts valuable information from the 
data, recording the research and thinking process, quickly evoking memories or 
subsequent analysis and looking around at the same time to help sort out ideas. 
NVivo software has strong applicability, and it can be combined with a variety of 
models to analyze problems and solve problems. 
 
The general process of analyzing cases using NVivo software is four stages, which 
are the preparation stage, coding stage, qualitative analysis stage and integration 
stage. The preparation phase is divided into adding new data, creating original data 
and finishing data; the coding phase includes: creating nodes and encoding using 
attributes. The specific application NVivo analysis process is shown in Figure 2. 
 
At present, the application of Chinese scholars to NVivo is mostly concentrated in 
the fields of sociology, pedagogy and psychology.  However, some scholars in the 
world have used NVivo to process and analyze accident data, summarize and 
organize the causes of the accident, and have obtained satisfactory results, 
illustrating the huge role of the software in accident analysis (Goh et al., 2015;  
Underwood et al., 2016; Wold & Laumann 2015). 
 
2.2 HFACS accident cause model and its application 
HFACS was proposed by American scholars Dr. Douglas A. Wiegmann and Dr. 
Scott A. Shappell. Wiegmann and Shappell revealed six kinds of human error 
views based on the assumption of the nature of human errors and the causes of 
them. They are the cognitive point of view, the ergonomic point of view, the 
behavioural point of view, the aviation medical point of view, the social 
psychology point of view, and the organizational point of view. After analyzing the 
advantages and disadvantages of the above people's mistaken views, Reason (1990) 
established the famous "Swiss Cheese" model, namely the HFACS framework. 
 
The Reason model is a conceptual model mentioned in the famous psychology 
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book "Human error" by Professor James Reason of the University of Manchester. 
According to Reason, the accident occurs in the production process, where the 
interaction between system elements is problematic.  This theory is often referred 
to as the accidental "Swiss Cheese" model (see Figure 3): 
(1) Each piece of cheese represents a level, which is divided into four levels:
organizational influence, unsafe supervision, the precondition of unsafe acts, and
unsafe acts. Each hole in the cheese represents an error point. If the holes in the
four slices of cheese are connected in a straight line so that the light can penetrate
straight through, the accident will happen immediately.
(2) As long as one of the cheeses is moved so that the light can penetrate wirelessly,
the accident can be avoided.
(3) Emphasize the organization's overall error prevention ability.
According to the "Swiss Cheese" model, the accident occurred under the combined 
action of the operator's explicit error of unsafe acts and the potential error of his 
organization, while previous studies generally believed that the cause of the 
accident was unsafe behaviour of personnel which triggers accident directly. 
However, the holes in the "Swiss cheese" model, i.e., the error points, were not 
clearly defined and did not indicate what the specific error points at each level 
were, so it was impossible to find these error points before the accident and make 
an improvement based on these error points. 
In order to better use the model and reveal the factors that affect the occurrence of 
accidents in the entire production system, researchers and accident investigators 
need to study what the holes in each piece of cheese represent. Only in this way, 
the cause of the accident can be found more clearly in the accident investigation, to 
provide a reference for avoiding the same type of accident later. It may be better to 
detect and correct the errors before they occur to avoid them. 
In order to make the "Swiss Cheese" model meet the needs of accident 
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investigations, Wiegmann and Shappell refined the HFACS\based on the analysis 
of hundreds of flight accident reports caused by human factors. Initially, HFACS 
(figure 4) was designed for military aviation, but it also showed its effectiveness in 
the field of civil aviation. Subsequently, it was used in the fields of navigation, 
railway, coal mine and medical treatment to carry out accident analysis and 
investigation, and it can be traced surface behaviour to deep organizational causes, 
both in determining the cause of the accident and in formulating preventive 
measures, which is of great significance in determining the cause of an accident or 
formulating preventive measures. 
HFACS summarized the causes of the accident at four levels proposed by the 
Swiss Cheese Model and concretized each level (figure 4). 
Figure 3 "Swiss cheese" model (Reason, 1990) 
Human Factor Analysis and Classification System (Human Factor Analysis and 
Classification System) is one of the basic theories to investigate and analyze the 
cause of an accident. HFACS model defines the "hole" in the Reason model, 
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analyzing human error from four levels, the first level (unsafe acts of the 
operator-active failure) is the level of most accident investigators concentrated. 
The second level (a precondition for unsafe acts-potential/active failure) addresses 
potential failures and more obvious active failures in the causal sequence of 
accidents. It also describes the operator's unqualified conditions and unqualified 
practices in practice. The third level (unsafe supervision-potential failure) traces 
the causes of unsafe behavior in the causal chain of unsafe events to the forefront 
supervisor. The fourth level (organizational factor-potential failure) describes the 
direct impact of the upper management's decision-making errors on the 
supervisory behavior and the behavioral premise of the operator's behavior. 
Figure 4 Flight Accident HFACS Framework 
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Chapter 3 Maritime Accident HFACS cause model construction 
HFACS is the human cause analysis model designed with the background of 
aviation safety accident, in the process of applying HFACS to the analysis of 
maritime accident report, there will be HFACS factors and the accident cause 
described in the maritime accident report cannot correspond to, or its 
corresponding relationship has certain ambiguity, so it is necessary to determine 
the maritime accident HFACS model according to the characteristics of the 
maritime accident. 
3.1 Maritime accident HFACS model 
Scholars have studied the mechanism of maritime accidents for many years. Many 
scholars, like Chen et al. (2013) and Zhang et al. (2019), have summed up many 
factors, including technology, management, operation and organization. Based on 
previous studies and the aviation safety accident HFACS model framework, the 
marine accident HFACS model framework is shown in figure 5. 
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Figure 5 A model framework for maritime accident HFACS 
3.2 Model operational process 
The research of the scholars is very worthy of recognition and has its rationality. 
Therefore, according to the requirements of each element of HFACS, through the 
literature review on the analysis of maritime accidents, this article sets the 
connotation of each element in the HFACS model of maritime accidents. 
3.2.1 Unsafe acts 
In maritime accidents, the unsafe behaviour of the crew is often the direct cause of 
the accident. Combined with the HFACS model, these unsafe behaviours are two 
types of errors and violations; errors include three types of skills errors, decision 
errors and perceptual errors. There are two types of accidental violations. 
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Errors in maritime accidents are mainly due to unsafe operations that should not 
occur in the crew's skills, decision-making, and perception. Crew errors due to 
inattention, memory errors, and unskilled skills when performing skill operations; 
the main manifestations include irregular operations, brute force, blind work, risky 
operations, and the use of wrong methods. In terms of decision-making, due to 
various reasons, the crews' inadequate planning in the execution of tasks and 
improper assessment of the situation lead to operational errors; the main 
manifestations are incorrect operating procedures, improper selection of plans, 
handling problems beyond the ability, and insufficient experience in the face of 
mutations. In terms of perception, the crew is mainly visually wrong during 
operations such as electronic chart viewing and navigation direction judgment, 
resulting in inconsistency between the cognition and the actual situation. The main 
manifestations are instrument reading errors, direction judgment errors, altitude 
and distance judgment errors, etc. 
The crew's violations were mainly carried out for operation progress and operation 
convenience. Some violations can be tolerated by the supervisors, and they are 
used to natural, while some cannot be approved by the supervisors, and many of 
such violations are too late to prevent and cause uncorrectable errors, including 
serious violations of operations and failure to implement safety technical measures. 
3.2.2 Precondition for unsafe acts 
The reasons why crew members have unsafe acts during operation are mainly due 
to the following three types of prerequisites, namely personnel factors, conditions 
of operation and environmental factors. Personnel factors include coordination or 
communication or planning, bridge resource management and personal readiness; 
conditions of operation include cognitive factors, perceptual factors, 
psycho-behavioural factors, and physical/mental limitations; environmental factors 
include physical and technical environments. 
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In maritime accidents, the problem of crew resource management leads to unsafe 
behaviour mainly manifested in the communication and coordination between the 
crew and the crew, such as the lack of crew teamwork, poor communication of 
information, and the lack of leadership skills of leaders. Among the personnel 
factors, the personal preparation status mainly refers to the insufficient skills, 
energy preparation of the operator at work. The main manifestations are failure to 
comply with rest regulations, lack of training, and poor eating habits. 
 
Unsafe behaviour has a great relationship with the condition of operation, 
including cognitive factors, perceptual factors, psycho-behavioural factors, and 
physical/mental limitations. Cognitive factors refer to the crew's ability to think, 
Reason and remember, such as mental fatigue, anxiety, and loss of situational 
awareness. Perceptual factors refer to immediate sensory experience, listening, and 
observation capabilities are insufficient to perform tasks, such as pathological or 
physiological conditions that hinder safe operation, hallucinations, deviations in 
direction, or cold. Psycho-behavioural factors refer specifically to the crew's 
psychological factors that lead to unsafe behaviours, such as revenge and 
depression. Physical/mental limitation refers to a person's inherently limited range 
of capabilities in terms of body and intelligence, which is not suitable for 
operation. 
 
When the crew operates the ship, their physical and technical environment will 
also affect their behaviour. The physical environment mainly refers to the 
environment of the operator's workplace, such as the bad or sudden stratum 
conditions of the workplace, poor lighting, noise, vibration, toxic and harmful 
gases, dust, etc. These environmental factors will affect the judgment of the 
operator, making the operator very prone to incorrect operation. The technical 
environment mainly refers to the situation of the equipment operated by the 
operator, such as no safety protection equipment or poor quality of safety 
protection equipment, unreasonable control design, no monitoring test equipment 
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or equipment of poor quality, poor operation of equipment or poor maintenance. 
3.2.3 Unsafe Supervision 
Unsafe behaviour and its prerequisites can be found in on-site supervision. If 
handled promptly, unsafe behaviour may not occur, or unsafe behaviour will not 
lead to blowout accidents.  According to the HFACS accident model framework, 
the factors leading to the occurrence of maritime accidents during on-site 
supervision mainly include inadequate supervision, planned inappropriate 
operations, failed to correct known problem and supervision violations. 
Inadequate supervision of the crew's worksite means that the supervisor does not 
carry out proper supervision and guidance, such as inadequate safety education, 
inadequate supervision and management, low professional quality of the supervisor, 
and lack of attention to safety management. 
Planned inappropriate operations refer to the improper work plan formulated by 
the senior crew, which leads to the disorderly work of the crew, such as improper 
crew coordination, heavy workload, and lack of rest time for the staff. It is 
classified as a supervision factor because it is a problem that often occurs in the 
supervision content. 
Failure to correct problems during the supervision process is very serious and can 
directly lead to the occurrence of unsafe behaviours or accidents. It mainly refers 
to the failure of the supervisor to discover individual people, equipment, 
environment or other safety-related problems and behaviours. For example, the 
supervisor did not find the problem, found that the problem was not corrected, and 
the hidden trouble was not carefully checked. 
Supervision violations in the supervision process mean that the supervisor 
deliberately ignores the existing rules and regulations, such as the failure to 
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implement the rules and regulations and the violation of command in the 
supervision process. 
 
3.2.4 Management organizational factors 
In the analysis of maritime accidents, the organization factors cannot be ignored, 
because people in whatever position do their daily work based on organizational 
structure, management regulations, management processes, etc. Therefore, 
organizational factors cannot be ignored. According to the HFACS accident 
framework, it is concluded that resource management, organizational climate and 
organizational process are the three main factors. 
 
The organizational process refers to the rules and regulations for the daily 
management of the organization, such as imperfect safety management rules and 
regulations, unreasonable management processes, imperfect emergency plans, etc. 
The loopholes in these systems will lead to a series of operations such as no rules 
to follow and no supervision, and the certain preconditions or unsafe behaviour 
will inevitably occur for a long time, which provides the possibility of a maritime 
accident. 
 
Organizational climate mainly refers to safety management structure, leadership 
decision-making, accident investigation, values, beliefs, attitudes and other issues, 
such as lack of a good safety management structure, leadership decision-making 
does not consider safety and employees' safety awareness. These problems are not 
conducive to the realization of the safety management system and are not 
conducive to the development of supervision work, which will certainly not 
provide a positive impact on the prevention of maritime accidents. 
 
Resource management mainly refers to problems that are not conducive to safe 
production in terms of design, human resources, capital, facility equipment and 
adjustment, etc., such as lack of safety personnel, defects in facility equipment 
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design, unqualified equipment, insufficient capital investment, etc. These problems 
are easy to provide conditions for the occurrence of unsafe acts, which leads to the 
occurrence of maritime accidents. 
 
3.2.5 External factors 
Compared with the original HFACS model, many scholars have proposed external 
factors in recent years.  For example, Chen et al. (2013) divided the external 
factors into legislation gap, administrative oversight and design flaws in their 
published academic literature. Besides, Zhang et al. (2019) continued to add Social 
Factors at this level. Throughout the accident report, the author of this article found 
that the frequency of administration oversight, design flaws and social factors is 
not high or almost does not appear. Therefore, this article only lists external factors 
as regulatory factors and others at this level. It should be noted that Regulation 
factors mainly refer to loopholes in policies and regulations in certain sailing areas, 
and some newly issued policies by the government have not been verified, which 
has affected the safety of navigation. 
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Chapter 4 Maritime accident analysis based on NVivo 
4.1 Data resource 
The accident reports in this article come from multiple databases, namely the 
Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB), Marine Accident Investigation 
Branch (MAIB), Marine Investigation Report from Transportation Safety Board of 
Canada (TSB), and Transport Accident Investigation Commission New Zealand 
(TAIC). A total of 330 typical maritime accidents from 1998 to 2018 were 
collected worldwide. The types of accidents involved in the report include but are 
not limited to grounding, collision, fire, explosion, capsizing. There are various 
ship types involved, such as fishing vessels, offshore vessels, containerships, 
tankers, RO-ROs, bulk carriers, etc. 
Table 1- Maritime accident overview 
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4.2 Cause analysis of maritime accidents based on NVivo 
Based on NVivo analysis, the main processes of this paper are as follows: 
(1) Import the collected cases into the software and make a preliminary
arrangement to facilitate the subsequent analysis.
(2) The maritime accident HFACS model is established as the analysis node of
NVivo, and the node is established in the software.
(3) Based on the established node, the model of each element is output through the
function of the NVivo model, and the relationship between each element and its
content is displayed.
(4) Case-by-case coding analysis using established nodes.
(5) Output the coded results of the case, such as charts.
4.2.1 NVivo Maritime Accident Data Processing 
NVivo provides users with ways to import documents, pictures, audio, video and 
other materials. The accident cases used in this article are document materials. 
After careful study of the report, the author of this article found that more than 
95% of the accident reports have accident cause analysis. For MAIB and ATSB, 
the CONCLUSION sections of the report will list the causes of the accident. For 
TSB, the cause of the accident is listed in chapter Findings-Causes and 
Contributing Factors. Finally, TAIC placed the cause of the accident in the 
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Executive Summary chapter. 
 
Therefore, the author of this article records the chapters related to the causes of 
accidents in the 330 accident cases into the Word document and saves them in the 
DOC format. After simple sorting, NVivo is imported as internal material for 
coding analysis, as shown in Figure 6. 
 
 
Figure 6 Introduction of maritime accident cases 
 
4.2.2 NVivo automatic coding based on themes identification 
NVivo's automatic coding function (Figure 7) can be used to capture the cause of 
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the accident in all directions. In the end, NVivo automatically encoded from 330 
files and got 1998 nodes involving a total of 3517 references, as shown in Figure 8. 
Through the visualization function of NVivo (Figure 9), the software draws a word 
cloud figure according to the word frequency of the nodes. We can clearly 
distinguish that the words with a higher frequency are bridge, ship, master, 
management, fire, engine, crew, which are words closely related to maritime safety. 
Figure 9 shows an example of sentence-based reference point results. The left half 
of the picture is the automatically encoded node, and the right part is the sentence 
where the specific reference point is located. Table 2 shows a more detailed 
example of automatic coding. 
Figure 7 NVivo automatic coding function 
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Figure 8 NVivo automatic encoding results 
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Figure 9 Word cloud 
Figure 10 Encoding details 
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SYSTEM 95 154 PLAN 78 128 
safety management system 16 17 passage 
plan 
20 28 
watchkeeping alarm system 7 7 contingenc
y plan 
9 9 
safe ship management 
system 
5 6 planned 
route 
6 7 
electronic chart system 4 5 planned 
track 
4 6 
fuel system 4 4 voyage plan 5 5 












safety management system 
procedures 
2 3 FIRE 49 102 
cargo system 1 3 fire alarm 4 4 
emergency pitch control 
system 
1 3 fire fighters 2 4 
BRIDGE 87 130 emergency 
fire pump 
2 3 
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bridge team 41 52 fire drill 3 3 
bridge team members 6 9 fire hose 3 3 
bridge resource 
management 
7 7 local fire 
department 
1 3 




bridge team management 3 4 fire watch 3 3 
bridge watch alarm 3 4 
good bridge resource 
management 
3 3 
bridge crew 3 3 
4.2.3 Node establishment based on maritime accident HFACS model 
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Nodes in NVivo are a collection of topics, including free nodes, tree nodes, cases, 
matrices, relationships, etc. Tree-like nodes are mainly used in the research process 
of this article. The tree node is a node established based on the elements of the 
maritime accident HFACS model. First, four parent nodes of organizational 
management factors, unsafe supervision factors, the precondition of unsafe acts 
and unsafe acts are established. Then establish the relevant child nodes, as shown 
in Figure 11. 
Figure 11 Establish a tree node 
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After establishing a tree-like node, After establishing the tree-like nodes, this 
article puts the 1998 nodes automatically created by NVivo into the HFACS 
established by the author according to the definitions of the HFACS elements 
mentioned in Chapter 3. Another big advantage of NVivo is reflected again, 
namely the automatic deletion of duplicate nodes. Because multiple nodes 
obtained by automatic coding may appear in the same meaning group, that is, a 
node in the HFACS framework and the author does not need to spend extra effort 
to delete the duplicate code. After putting NVivo's automatic coding into the 
HFACS framework, the final result is shown in Figure 12. We got a total of 1522 
reference points 
 
Figure 12 HFACS-based coding results 
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NVivo can output a visual model diagram according to the tree-like node, which 
can visually display the hierarchy level of each element in the HFACS model, as 
shown in Figure 13. 
Figure 13 Hierarchy chart of nodes 
In NVivo, users can choose to use various functions such as graphs, queries, or 
models to present nodes that meet the query conditions, visually display the data to 
be analyzed, and observe the relationship between the nodes. The nodes 
established in Figure 11 are derived from the maritime accident HFACS model, 
which is the cause of the maritime accident. 
4.3 Definition of maritime accident case attributes 
When reading and sorting the maritime accident report, the author of this article 
defined the attributes of each case in NVivo. The purpose is to analyze the report 
classification below. The details are shown in Figure 14, and the attributes set for 
all reports in this article include accident type, year, database, ship type, flag, etc. 
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Figure 14 Accident case attribute definition 
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Chapter 5 Output and analysis of maritime accident results based 
on NVivo 
According to HFACS, the causes of maritime accidents are external factors, 
organization factors, unsafe supervision, the precondition for unsafe act and unsafe 
acts. After encoding 330 maritime accidents using NVivo, a total of 1526 reference 
points for various factors were obtained, that is, 1526 cause factors were analyzed 
in 330 maritime accidents, including 34 External factors, 174 Organization factors, 
320 Unsafe Supervision, 601 Preconditions of unsafe acts, 393 Unsafe acts. It can 
be seen that the main influencing factors of maritime accidents are the 
precondition of unsafe acts, unsafe supervision and unsafe acts (Figure 15). 
Figure 15 Maritime causal factor coding results 
5.1 Analysis of external factors of maritime accidents 
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Figure 16 External factor coding results 
It can be seen from Figure 16 that 40% of external factors are regulatory factors, 
which involve STCW and the coastal transportation policies of some countries 
that differ from international standards. The remaining factors mainly include 
the untimely release of information by the local port bureau, unprofessional fire 
protection departments on the shore, and inadequate training of port pilots. 
5.2 Analysis of organizational factors of maritime accidents 
The coding results of organizational management factors are shown in Figure 13. 
It can be seen from the coding result diagram that the organizational process is 
the most serious problem that causes maritime accidents among organizational 
factors. By looking at the content of the organization process vulnerabilities in 
NVivo, this article finds that the main problem is that the company's rules and 
procedures are too simple, and the security management system is full of 
vulnerabilities. These problems have led to the failure of the department that 
supplies materials to the ship, the company's safety assessment of the ship is not 
in place, and it may even affect the crew's unclear division of labour. Through 
the overall analysis of the causes of maritime accidents, we know that 
organizational factors are a very prominent item, so the lack of safety culture 
and loopholes in resource management cannot be ignored. The lack of safety 
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culture is mainly due to the lack of safety awareness among crew members, such 
as alcohol management before watching; material management mainly 
manifests as insufficient fire-fighting equipment, insufficient navigation and 
alarm equipment, and insufficient qualified crew equipment, etc. 
The focus is on improving the organizational process. Only by building on 
complete rules and regulations can we build a good safety culture and provide 
sufficient resources to ensure safety. 
Figure 17 Organizational factor coding results 
5.3 Analysis of Unsafe Supervision of Maritime Accident 
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Figure 18 Unsafe Supervision coding results 
The coding results of unsafe supervision are shown in Figure 18. It is not 
difficult to see from the coding results that planned inappropriate operations and 
inadequate supervision are the two most serious influencing factors of maritime 
accidents among unsafe supervision factors，Failed to correct known problem 
and supervision violation to have a relatively low probability of occurrence. It 
can be seen from the NVivo coding results that the main factors leading to 
insufficient supervision of maritime accidents are mainly insufficient oversight, 
lack of proper monitoring, no clear regulatory requirement. For planned 
improper operation, because there was no clear division of labour before sailing, 
and eventually, the accident occurred, the person in charge did not perform his 
work. Failure to correct the problem is mainly reflected in the fact that the 
captain has discovered that the ship's speed is too fast or other crew members 
have executed wrong instructions, but the captain has not corrected them. 
It can be seen that during the supervision process, the quality of the supervisory 
personnel and the plan before the voyage have a great influence on the occurrence 
of marine accidents. 
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5.4 Analysis of Precondition of unsafe acts of maritime accidents 
The precondition of unsafe acts coding results is shown in Figure 19, Figure 20, 
Figure 21, and Figure 22. It can be seen from Fig. 19 that the precondition of 
unsafe acts in maritime accidents is mainly Personal factors and bridge resource 
management is the most prominent in conjunction with Fig. 21, and it is mainly 
poor crew training results in varying qualities, bridge warning equipment to ensure 
navigation safety, insufficient fire extinguishing equipment, inadequate crew 
communication in the bridge, and insufficient human resources in the bridge. The 
bridge is the busiest place in maritime navigation. If the crew members in the 
bridge are not communicating well, or the materials, technology, equipment and 
personnel related to the bridge are not allocated properly, it will easily lead to 
accidents at sea. Besides, cooperative communication and personal readiness also 
play a very important role. Through reading the report, the author found that 
insufficient communication between the crew, including the crew between the 
engine room and the deck, and inadequate voyage plan are two main 
manifestations of this subdivision. In terms of personal readiness, the crew was 
exhausted by other tasks before performing the tasks, which led to insufficient 
personal preparation and accidents. 
From the overall analysis of the causes of maritime accidents, the precondition of 
unsafe acts accounted for the first, so the state of the operator and personnel factors 
should also be paid attention to. Condition of operation is mainly manifested in 
cognitive factors, the main content of which is the fatigue performance of the crew, 
or the crew's confusion about the state of the ship. 
It can be seen from the coding results that the operator's perceptual factors and 
physical or mental limitations involve little or no. It may be that the accident 
investigation does not involve this problem or does not exist. If it does not exist, it 
will be a good phenomenon. However, if the cause of this aspect is not investigated, 
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it means that there are still some problems missing in these marine accident 
investigations. 
 
The high frequency of cognitive factors, especially crew fatigue, is not surprising, 
but the psycho-behavioural factors also have a place that surprised the author. 
Originally, the author believed that there would be more crew depression and other 
similar conditions in this part, because the marine navigation environment is 
relatively dull and boring, though there are more and more types of entertainment 
facilities on board. However, after reading the coding results, the author found that 
there is no crew psychological depression in this part. The words are mostly due to 
the overconfidence of the crew members, which led to the contempt for the 
complicated sea conditions and, eventually, the accident. For the crew's physical 
and mental deficiencies and whether they are sick at work, there is little mention in 
the report. 
 
Regarding environmental factors, the marine navigation environment is 
unpredictable. Although marine technology has become more and more developed 
with the progress of the times, once the key equipment fails, it will have a fatal 
blow to navigation safety. More common in the report are intermittent failures of 
navigation equipment, outdated equipment, loud noise, unclear navigation aids, 
and poor equipment design. The lack of maintenance is inextricably linked to 
human factors. The physical environment also requires us to be vigilant to it. The 
reports are more common in-cabin noise and bad weather. The author believes that 
people will design better climate navigation algorithms and cabin driving 
environments in the future. For the technical environment, the main Reason is that 
the crew relies too much on the electronic equipment, which eventually leads to an 
accident when the problem is too late to be corrected. 
 
In any case, the existence of the precondition of unsafe acts provides the 
possibility of unsafe acts, and the facts also indicate that the precondition of unsafe 
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acts is the most normal part of the word in the accident report. Therefore, in 
preventing maritime accidents, we must pay attention and pay special attention to 
the bridge factors. 
Figure 19 Precondition of unsafe acts encoding result 
Figure 20 Condition of operation encoding results 
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Figure 21 Personal factors encoding results 
Figure 22 Environmental factors encoding results 
5.4 Analysis of unsafe acts in maritime accidents 
The coding results of Unsafe acts are shown in Figure 23, Figure 24 and Figure 25. 
It can be seen from Figure 23 that most of the unsafe behaviours in maritime 
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accidents are errors and relatively few violations. It can be found from Fig.24 that 
errors mainly focus on skill-based errors, and relatively few perceptual errors and 
decision errors. By reviewing, it can be seen that the decision-making error is 
mainly manifested in the crew's underestimation of risk in the work or failure to 
make a clear investigation of the risk, leading to a judgment error. For example, 
the master's mental map of the rock did not include the underwater shape and 
extent of the rock; the pilot's main focus was on when the electronic bearing line 
(EBL) would approach Pointe Fortier rather than the exact position of the vessel; 
the master underestimated the risk posed by the northeasterly winds forecast for 
the area and chose to continue the voyage after the delay caused by the unrolling 
of the towing cable. Skill errors are mainly due to poor operator quality, poor skill 
mastery leading to operation errors, and lack of concentration leading to missed 
the best way to deal with problems. For example, the crew lacks understanding of 
the dangers of loading and unloading coal cargo; after initiating a course alteration, 
the chief mate focused on finding a visual reference, the Ange-Gardien range, and 
did not utilize the bridge navigational equipment to effectively monitor the vessel's 
progress as it proceeded off course and went aground; The crew did not use an 
echo sounder when the ship entered the shallow water. 
 
Unsafe behaviour is usually the direct cause of the accident. Whether it is error or 
violation, we should take it seriously. From Figure 25, there are more exceptional 
violations than routine violations, which shows that exceptional violations are 
more likely to cause accidents. Through the inspection, it is known that the 
accidental violations in the maritime accident mainly include that the captain and 
crew did not abide by the company's drug and alcohol policies when the accident 
occurred; Failure to follow the navigation and duty standards and procedures set in 
the ship's safety management system before the accident; The captain failed to 
comply with STCW 95's requirements for rest time during a voyage to catch up 
with the schedule, resulting in crew fatigue and accidents. 
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Routine violations are relatively harmless and easily accepted by supervisors，For 
example, the implementation of the post-holding system is not carried out, and the 
observation is not carried out according to the prescribed number of times. 
Nevertheless, it is precise because of these illegal operations for a long time, which 
led to the occurrence of maritime accidents. 
 
In general, unsafe behaviour can directly lead to the occurrence of maritime 
accidents. In the process of preventing maritime accidents, we must pay attention 
to the control of each unsafe behaviour, especially the control of skill-based skills. 
 
Figure 23 Unsafe acts encoding results 
 
Figure 24 Error encoding results 
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Figure 25 Violation encoding results 
 
5.5 Human factor analysis based on different flag states 
The coding results of different ship registrations are shown in Figure 26 and Figure 
27. 
 
Figure 26 Coding results for Japanese, German and Greek ships 
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Figure 27 Coding results for the convenient flag ship 
This set of pictures compares the difference between ships represented by Japan, 
Germany and Greece and ships with flags of convenience. It can be seen that 
planned inappropriate communication (or coordination or planning), bridge 
resource management, and inadequate supervision appear in both types of ships. 
However, for ships with convenience signs, their probability of skill-based error is 
greater than that of ships with traditional flags. This indicates that the operation 
level of the crew of the convenience flag ship may be lower than the crew of the 
traditional flag ship. However, traditional flag ships have more perceptual errors 
and planning errors than convenient flag ships. 
5.6 Human factor analysis based on different types of ship 
Figures 28 to 33 show the coding results based on different ship types. The author 
observed that fishing vessels have a higher probability of bridge resource 
management problems than other types of vessels. In particular, fishing vessels 
need to pay attention to physical environment problems. The supplies of fishing 
vessels are more scarce than other ship types. On the contrary, all ship types except 
passenger vessels have a higher probability of skill-based error. For all ships, 
inadequate supervision and poor bridge resource management are the difficulties 
that all ship types need to face together. It can be seen that unsafe acts supervision, 
bridge-related resource distribution, communication in the bridge are the topics 
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that everyone needs to pay attention to. For RORO and tankers, including LNG 
and LPG, skill-based errors are the primary issue. For bulk carriers and 
containerships, bridge resource management is the top 1 in their common topic. 
Figure 28 Coding results for fishing vessels 
Figure 29 Coding results for tankers 
Figure 30 Coding results for passenger vessels 
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Figure 31 Coding results for RORO 
 
Figure 32 Coding results for bulk carriers 
 
Figure 33 Coding results for containerships 
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5.7 Human factor analysis based on different types of accidents 
Figures 34 to 36 show the coding results of different types of accidents. This 
section only lists the results of typical accidents, namely fire and explosion, 
collision, and grounding. For three types of accidents, skill-based errors and bridge 
resource management are their common enemies. For fires and explosions, the 
skill-based error is particularly prominent, mainly reflected in the inexperience of 
the crew's fire-fighting skills. Unlike the other two types of accidents, physical 
environment problem has additionally appeared in fire and explosion. It is usually 
due to the aging and damage of some equipment or pipelines, which eventually 
leads to fire and explosion. For grounding and collision, communication (or 
coordination or planning) factors are an increasingly serious problem, and 
cognitive, especially crew fatigue, can easily lead to these two types of accidents. 
Besides, the probability of occurrence of exceptional violation is also relatively 
high in collision accidents. Disasters often occur due to poor communication 
among crew members in the bridge, poor equipment or illegal operations. 
 
 
Figure 34 Coding results for fire and explosion 
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Figure 35 Coding results for grounding 
 
 
Figure 36 Coding results for collision 
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Chapter 6 Recommended measures for maritime accident 
intervention 
Maritime accidents will cause not only serious ecological harm, economic losses, 
but also cause serious casualties, which all we are unhappy to see. Through the 
analysis of the causal factors of marine accidents, this article puts forward the 
following suggestions for intervention. 
6.1 Implement organizational safety management system 
From the previous analysis, the very serious organizational factor in maritime 
accidents is that the organizational process is not in place. Combined with the lack 
of supervision, it is obvious that the situation of supervision and management has a 
very serious impact on the implementation of policies and regulations that restrict 
and regulate organizational work. Supervision management is a more direct safety 
management measure, and it also has a large impact on the prerequisites of unsafe 
behaviour and unsafe behaviour. 
Therefore, there are three suggestions for the intervention of maritime accidents. 
First, it is necessary to formulate detailed regulations on organizational work and 
to clarify the duties of the relevant crew in the regulations, and the implementation 
must be monitored. Second, it is necessary to formulate a comprehensive 
supervision system. This system is not only to supervise the implementation of the 
work regulations by the crew but also to find out whether the crew's behaviour and 
operation in daily navigation have hidden dangers of accidents. The site 
environment also needs to be supervised；Third, in order to better cooperate with 
the supervision and management system, this article recommends the 
establishment of a hidden safety inspection system, regular inspection and 
rectification of hidden dangers. 
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6.2 Improve crew working conditions 
The working status of the crew has a great influence on the occurrence of maritime 
accidents. From the analysis of the precondition of unsafe acts in the previous 
chapter, it is found that the causes of maritime accidents are mostly caused by crew 
fatigue and poor communication among the crew working in the bridge, which 
results in poor strain energy for crews to handle emergencies. Therefore, 
mitigating crew fatigue and improving crew work efficiency are items that should 
be emphasized in maritime accident intervention. 
 
Based on the above considerations, the following three suggestions are made on 
how to improve the working conditions of the crew. First, carry out more humane 
care activities, regularly ask the crew's psychological and fatigue status, and 
customize sensible diet and entertainment activities for the crew. Second, flexible 
scheduling to prevent crew members from being paralyzed by the unchangeable 
work schedule. Thirdly, with the help of AI technology, a fatigue warning device 
should be installed on the bridge, such as face recognition technology widely used 
in the field of automobile safety. 
 
6.3 Strengthen the construction of safety culture 
Strengthen the construction of safety culture, and the ultimate goal is to allow 
enterprises and crew to have a good safety climate. From the previous analysis, it 
can be concluded that the loopholes in safety culture are mainly employees' 
neglect of safety and do not care about the safety system. For the safety of 
maritime transportation and the avoidance of maritime accidents, the improvement 
of safety culture must be highly valued. 
 
Based on the above considerations, the following three points are proposed to 
avoid the occurrence of maritime accidents to enhance the construction of safety 
culture. First, develop a safety knowledge training system for production and 
regularly conduct safety navigation knowledge training, including the introduction 
WORLD MARITIME UNIVERSITY  DISSERTATION FOR 
  INTERNATIOANL TRANSPORT AND LOGISTICS 
51 
of maritime accident cases, the study of safety operation rules, and navigation 
technical points, etc., in order to improve the safety quality of crew members. 
Second, formulate a system for carrying out safety cultural activities and regularly 
organize safety activities, such as safety production knowledge contests, safety 
slogan solicitations, safety operation reward etc., to provide a safety culture 
climate. Third, formulate a pre-shift safety production knowledge question and 
answer system, and give appropriate punishment to employees who cannot know 
the safety knowledge of their position. In this way, we urge everyone to study and 
understand the knowledge of production safety earnestly. 
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Chapter 7 Conclusion and outlook 
7.1 Conclusion 
The main research conclusions of this paper are as follows: 
(1) According to the literature research methods, the HFACS model framework for
maritime accidents is established, and the content of each element is summarized,
which provides a basis for the analysis of maritime accidents using this model.
(2) With qualitative analysis software, NVivo, 330 maritime accident reporters
from ATSB, MAIB, TSB, and TAIC from 1998 to 2018 were statistically analyzed,
and the causes of maritime accidents were obtained from five aspects: external
factors, organizational factors, unsafe supervision, the precondition of unsafe acts
and unsafe acts.
(3) Based on the analysis results, suggestions for implementing the organizational
safety management system, improving the working conditions of the crew and
strengthening the construction of safety culture are given to prevent maritime
accidents. It is expected to contribute to the intervention of maritime accidents.
7.2 Outlook 
Due to various reasons, there are the following three shortcomings, which need to 
be further studied and improved. 
(1) Since the writing of the paper can only be done on its own, the accuracy of the
coding summary for 330 reports will be higher in the case of multi-person
assistance and consistency testing.
(2) Since data sources come from different databases, it is questionable whether
reports from different systems can be applied uniformly.
(3) Because HFACS is only a human factor classification framework, it is
impossible to simply use this framework for correlation analysis between upper
and lower factors. In the future, we can continue to explore the correlation analysis
between factors to draw more conclusions.
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